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At War with the Constitution: A History Lesson from 
the Chief Justice· 
Thomas E. Baker· 
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist invokes the Roman legal 
maxim "Inter arma silent leges" or "In time of war the laws are silent" 
in this book about how war powers trump in individual civil liberties. 1 
That the powers of the government are greatest during war is but a tru-
ism. Certainly, warmaking Presidents have acted upon this belief. The 
Supreme Court usually has acquiesced to draconian measures by the 
Executive that would not be permitted during peacetime. The Chief 
Justice affirms this judgment of history with an important qualification: 
There is no reason to think that future wartime presidents will act dif-
ferently from Lincoln, Wilson, or Roosevelt, or that future Justices of 
the Supreme Court will decide questions differently from their prede-
cessors. But even though this be so, there is every reason to think that 
the historic trend against the least justified of the curtailments of civil 
liberty in wartime will continue in the future. It is neither desirable 
nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty will occupy as favored a po-
sition in wartime as it does in peacetime. But it is both desirable and 
likely that more careful attention will be paid by the courts to the ba-
sis for the government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing 
civil liberty. The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but they 
will speak with a somewhat different voice. 2 
' Book Reviewed: WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES 
IN WARTIME (Alfred A. Knopf, New York, NY. (1998); $26; pp. 256). 
" Book reviewed by: Thomas E. Baker, Copyright~ 1999, James Madison Chair in Con-
stitutional Law and Director of the Constitutional Resource Center, Drake University Law School; 
B.S. 1974, Florida State University and J.D. 1977 University of Florida. From September 1986 to 
January 1987, Professor Baker served as the Acting Administrative Assistant to Chief Justice 
Rehnquist. This review benefited from the author being present for the Dwight D. Opperman 
Lecture, Drake University School of Law, September 18, 1998, see Honorable William H. 
Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice of the United States, 47 DRAKE L. REv. 201 (1999). A 
shorter, unfootnoted version of this review appeared previously in A.B.A. J., Dec. 1998, at 76, 
and this version is published here with permission. 
I. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 728 (5th ed. 1979) ("It applies as between the state and its 
external enemies; and also in cases of civil disturbance where extrajudicial force may supersede 
the ordinary process of law.") 
2. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
224-25 (1998). 
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Those likely to read into this thesis a right-wing conspiracy or 
willing to dismiss it as the cant of an overly pragmatic Statist-minded' 
Reagan-appointed Chief Justice should pause over the company he 
keeps and the historical brief he files. 
"It is vain to oppose constitutional barriers to the impulse of self-
preservation," James Madison insisted in Federalist Paper No. 41, "It 
is worse than vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary 
usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of unneces-
sary and multiplied repetitions. "3 
In Federalist Paper No. 23, Alexander Hamilton characteristically 
went farther than Madison to insist that the textual powers of national 
defense "ought to exist without limitation" if only to be equal to any 
and every potential threat or danger. 4 
Thomas Jefferson strictly construed textual powers in the Constitu-
tion but recognized a higher duty of government and leaders: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the high 
duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The Jaws of neces-
sity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when in danger, are 
of higher obligation. To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence 
to written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, prop-
erty and all those who are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacri-
ficing the end to the means. 5 
Abraham Lincoln adhered to Jefferson's sense of higher duty with a 
vengeance. In the early days of the Civil War, Chief Justice Taney re-
buked Lincoln by ruling that only Congress could suspend the writ of 
habeas corpus, and further directed that the President be delivered a 
copy of the order requiring the release of a civilian being held in mili-
tary custody. 6 Lincoln responded with a special message to Congress-
from which Chief Justice Rehnquist takes the title for this book-to in-
voke emergency powers equal to the immediate danger of rebellion: 
"[A]re all the laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government it-
self go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"7 The military authorities 
ignored Taney's order but saw fit to release the prisoner later. Con-
3. THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 257 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
("These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or to define 
the extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them.") 
5. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to J.B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810), THE LIFE AND 
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 606, 606-07 (Adrienne Koch & William Peden, eds. 
1944). 
6. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cases 144 (Cir. Ct. 1861). 
7. Message to Congress in Special Session of July 4, 1861, THE COLLECTED WORKS OF 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN VOL. IV, 421, 430 (Roy P. Basler, ed. 1953). 
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gress, for its constitutional part, promptly passed a law authorizing the 
President to suspend the Great Writ. 
Indeed, civil liberties were among the greatest casualties of the 
Civil War. Under martial law, Union Generals ordered summary ar-
rests for draft resisters and conducted widescale warrantless searches 
and arrests of Southern sympathizers and opponents of the war. They 
then held military trials-under pain of banishment, indefinite impris-
onment, or death-charging whatever they deemed to be "disloyal 
practices" including making political speeches and writing newspaper 
editorials against military rule. 
Suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the civilian courts made all 
this possible without any of the protections afforded by the Bill of 
Rights. What about the rule of law and the law of the Constitution? 
Justice Holmes, a thrice-wounded Civil War veteran, would later opine, 
"When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of 
peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be 
endured so long as men fight and that no court could regard them as 
protected by any constitutional right. "8 
The four-fifths emphasis of this book is on the lesson of the Civil 
War described in thirteen chapters. Indeed, as originally conceived, the 
Chief Justice would have ended his lesson there without dealing with 
the two declared world wars. 9 The last fifth of the book-the four brief 
chapters on World War I and World War 11-elaborate on his analysis 
of the past and reinforce his prediction for the future. He is careful to 
explain that his thesis is limited to what might be described as the con-
stitutional war powers of the government: constitutional powers during 
constitutionally declared wars. 10 
The reader must understand an important distinction in the consti-
tutional thinking of the Chief Justice. It should not be implied that he is 
endorsing some notion of a living Constitution that evolves over time 
under the nurturing of judges to expand government powers when the 
judges deem it necessary or expedient or appropriate. 11 Rather, he con-
ceives of these war powers to be contained in the text and original con-
8. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). 
9. Justice Rehnquist: At first I thought it would be just a book about civil liberties in 
the Civil War, but then it turned out that didn't have quite enough material - (laughs) 
- for an entire book, and I got interested in carrying it forth - you know, carrying 
it forward into World War I and World War II. 
Interview by Brian Lamb with Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, United States Supreme Court, 
Book TV on C-SPAN 2 (October 25, 1998) (visited Sept. 6, 1999) 
< /irtp:l!n·lvw./JOokrv.or,;lrelmquist _transript.asp >. 
10. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 218. 
11. See William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv. 693 
(1976). 
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ception of the framers but only available to the government at a time of 
grave threat and serious emergency, during a time of a declared war. 12 
This is a legal realist's account. Civil libertarians and judge-
worshippers alike will be chagrined at the role of the Justices to join 
ranks and march in step with the commander-in-chief. In the infamous 
but unanimous initial decision upholding the military program to evacu-
ate and relocate Japanese-Americans during World War 11-joined in by 
such civil libertarians as Justices Black and Douglas-Chief Justice 
Stone quoted his predecessor Charles Evans Hughes but sounded more 
like Hamilton: "The war power of the national government is 'the 
power to wage war successfully. . . . ' It extends to every matter and 
activity so related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and prog-
ress." 13 
Chief Justice Rehnquist first takes the reader through the major 
court cases of the Civil War and Reconstruction era-Ex parte Merry-
man (1861), 14 Ex parte Vallandigham (1864), 15 Ex parte Milligan 
(1866), 16 Ex parte McCardle (1869)17-and goes on to detail the mili-
tary commission proceedings that condemned the conspirators in the 
Lincoln assassination-to trace the historical nadir of civil liberties. His 
12. "Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or 
remove or diminish the restrictions imposed upon power granted or reserved ..... While emer-
gency does not create power, emergency may furnish the occasion for the exercise of power." 
Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425-26 (1934). 
13. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 
The war power of the national government is 'the power to wage war success-
fully.' See Charles Evans Hughes, War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 A.B.A. 
Rep. 232, 239. It extends to every matter and activity so related to war as substantially 
to affect its conduct and progress. The power is not restricted to the winning of victo-
ries in the field and the repulse of enemy forces. It embraces every phase of the na-
tional defense, including the protection war materials and the members of the armed 
forces from injury and from the dangers which attend the rise, prosecution and progress 
of war. ... Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exer-
cise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, it has necessarily 
given them wide scope for the exercise of judgement and discretion in determining the 
nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and I the selection of the means for 
resisting it. ... Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judg-
ment and discretion and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government 
on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not for any 
court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its judgment for theirs. 
/d. at 93 (upholding a criminal conviction for violating a military curfew). See also Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding a criminal conviction for violating an order of ex-
clusion from a declared military area); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944) (holding that the stat-
ute ratifying the military evacuation and relocation program did not authorize an overly prolonged 
detention of a citizen whose loyalty was conceded). 
14. 17 Fed. Cases 144 (Cir. Ct. Md. 1861). 
15. 68 u.s. 243 (1863). 
16. 71 u.s. 2 (1866). 
17. 74 U.S. 506 (1868). 
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historical conclusion is that the Civil War experience became "a sort of 
benchmark for future wartime presidents." Is 
There were important similarities and important differences be-
tween the Civil War and World War I, between how Lincoln and how 
Wilson conducted their presidencies.I9 The Chief Justice points out that 
the Wilson administration shared the wartime instinct to suppress criti-
cism but could rely on congressional statutes rather than presidential 
fiats and that the federal courts were more prominent. There were not 
trials of civilians in military courts and the writ of habeas corpus was 
not suspended. He seeks to separate his thesis about wartime powers 
from the notorious "Palmer Raids" -the wholesale arrests, interroga-
tions, and deportations named after the then Attorney General-by em-
phasizing that they occurred after the war and were more in response to 
perceived threats of anarchists and criminal syndicalists. 
The book the fastforwards through the criminalization of dissident 
speech during World War I, the World War II internment of Japanese-
Americans on the West Coast, and the imposition of total martial law in 
Hawaii from 1941 to 1944 to reinforce the author's conclusion. Attor-
ney General Francis Biddle's observation about FOR is representative 
of presidential attitudes: "Nor do I think that the Constitutional diffi-
culty plagued him. The Constitution has not greatly bothered any war-
time President. That was a question of law, which ultimately the Su-
preme Court must decide. And meanwhile-probably a long 
meanwhile-we must get on with the war. "20 Thus the Chief Justice's 
history lesson is that the Executive Branch will prosecute the war 
abroad and have its way with civil liberties at home, while the Supreme 
Court merely stands by, for the most part, perhaps disapproving the 
most grievous and least justified domestic transgressions, but even then 
usually only after-the-fact. 2I 
He writes his chapter on World War II with the perspective of a 
veteran who lived through those years. 22 It is interesting to watch the 
Chief Justice behave like any other Court-watcher, going down the line-
up on the bench and then analyzing the Supreme Court's judicial 
handiwork in a line of cases. Perhaps by design, the Chief Justice tries 
to analyze the infamous Japanese internment cases from the standpoint 
18. See Rehnquist, supra note 2. at 171. 
19. See /d. at 182-83. 
20. /d. at 191-92. 
21. See CHRISTOPHER N. MAY, IN THE NAME OF WAR: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE WAR 
POWERS SINCE 1918 (1989); JAMES G. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 
(1951). 
22. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 184-202. 
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of the majority on the Court at the time, based on the records and the 
briefs, and taking into account the state of constitutional law back when 
those decisions came down. He almost begrudgingly admits to "a cer-
tain disingenuousness in this sequence of three opinions"23 in the Hira-
bayashi, 24 Korematsu25 and Endo26 decisions-conceding that all three 
individuals were similarly situated: the petitioners were three equally 
loyal Americans who alleged they were being unjustifiably denied their 
civil rights and civil liberties. But he concludes that the Court's per-
formance illustrates his thesis because the Court was willing to rule 
against the government and in favor of the individual only in the last 
case in the series, when the country was near winning the war. 
The Chief Justice's explication of these cases is troubling. He 
makes a move here that is as positivistic and formalistic as it is unnec-
essary and unsubstantiated, an outdated move that is peculiarly ahistori-
cal in a book about history. He attempts to distinguish between the Is-
sei-immigrants from Japan who were not naturalized citizens-and the 
Nisei-American-born children of those immigrants who enjoyed all the 
rights of citizens. He tries to defend the military for erring on the side 
of military security in an uncertain emergency. He maintains that con-
stitutional law was undeveloped and unclear. In addition, he seems to 
imply that hind-sighted critics are somehow being unfair to the military 
and to the Court by condemning what was done under a wartime con-
stitutional dispensation. 27 Most ironic is the Chief Justice's invocation 
of the tradition of the Alien and Sedition Act of 1798. He also seems to 
quarrel with the way generations of law professors and law students 
have come to understand these cases: that the government's classifica-
tion was at once so overinclusive and so underinclusive as to be invidi-
ous and unconstitutional. 28 
It is no small fact that the Supreme Court cases involved individuals 
23. /d. at 202. 
24. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
25. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
26. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
27. C-SPAN: What do you think you would have done back then, if you had been in a 
leadership position? 
Justice Rehnquist: Oh, I think one of the most difficult things in the world to do, is to 
second-guess people who were in leadership positions at that time. You know, it's very 
easy, in the atmosphere of the late 1990s, to say something was a very bad thing to 
have done. That doesn't mean that it was not a very bad thing to have done. 
But so far as criticizing people who were in leadership positions at that time, you've got 
to realize they operated under the ethos and the standards of the times in which they 
lived .... 
See Interview, supra note 9, at 14. 
28. See Tussman & Tenbroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 341 
(1949). 
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of Japanese descent who were American citizens, but more importantly 
the Chief Justice inexplicably ignores how the history of this episode 
has been totally and completely revised. The consensus is that these de-
cisions have been overruled in the court of history, except for the im-
portant background principle in the opinions that governmental racial 
classifications should be reviewed with the highest and strictest judicial 
scrutiny. The actual convictions in the lead cases have been vacated and 
set aside in extraordinary judicial proceedings. Congress has enacted a 
formal governmental apology and a reparations program for survivors. 
The contemporary historical understanding of the episode is well-
established and equally well-accepted that the government officials gave 
in to popular ignorance and racist sentiments and affirmatively exagger-
ated the threats to security to mislead the courts willfully and materi-
ally. Finally, the Supreme Court's performance has gone down in his-
tory as one of its most craven moments. With all due respect, the Chief 
Justice's otiose chapter dissenting from this revised history is idiosyn-
cratic and unpersuasive. 29 
The chapter on Hawaii under martial law draws attention to a little 
known part of American history. 30 In the aftermath of the attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the government declared a level of martial law that re-
sembled the Civil War invocations. The Chief Justice points to the Su-
preme Court's 1946 ruling against the government as the exception that 
proves the rule of his book: only the most extreme measures against 
civil rights and civil liberties-suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
and military prosecutions of civilians for common crimes-will be 
deemed to have exceeded war powers when judicially reviewed after 
the war. 31 
Although the martial law imposed in Hawaii approached that of the 
Civil War the Chief Justice notes important differences between the war 
between the states and the declared world wars that qualify the com-
parison. 32 President Lincoln had depended on executive powers but the 
presidents during the world wars followed congressional authorizations. 
Therefore, the powers of Presidents Wilson and Roosevelt were maxi-
mized. 33 The role of the federal courts, especially the Supreme Court, 
has greatly expanded in jurisdiction and influence during the 201h cen-
29. See generally PETER IRONS, ED., JUSTICE DELAYED: THE RECORD OF THE JAPANESE 
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1989); PETER IRONS, JUSTICES AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE 
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983). 
30. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 212-17. 
31. See Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
32. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 219-21. 
33. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636-37 (1952) (Jackson, 
J., concurring). 
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tury. This coincided with developments in the theory and precedents of 
civil rights and civil liberties so that there was more tolerance for dis-
sent and for dissenters in the courts and in the popular culture during 
the modern era. 
Having made the historical case for the maxim "Inter arma silent 
leges" as a description of how the Constitution operates and functions 
during wartime, the Chief Justice concludes his book with the inevitable 
question of philosophy: "Is this reluctance a necessary evil-necessary 
because judges, like other citizens, do not wish to hinder a nation's 
'war effort' or is it actually a desirable phenomenon?"34 His own an-
swer is based on the proper context of a civil liberty being a freedom of 
a citizen, an individual living in society: 
In any civilized society the most important task is achieving a proper 
balance between freedom and order. In wartime, reason and history 
both suggest that this balance shifts to some degree in favor of order-
in favor of the government's ability to deal with conditions that 
threaten the national well-being. It simply cannot be said, therefore, 
that in every conflict between individual liberty and governmental 
authority the former should prevail. And if we feel free to criticize 
court decisions that curtail civil liberty, we must also feel free to look 
critically at decisions favorable to civil liberty. 35 
To conclude his historical exegesis, the Chief Justice brings us back 
one last time to Lincoln's dilemma to ask and answer rhetorically, 
"Should he, to paraphrase his own words, have risked losing the Union 
that gave life to the Constitution because that charter denied him the 
necessary authority to preserve the Union? Cast in these terms, it is dif-
ficult to quarrel with his decision. "36 
Throughout the book the Chief Justice is revealed to be an accom-
plished amateur historian, a most able stylist, and a first rate storyteller. 
One cannot help but surmise that his hobby of history is something he 
enjoys and finds satisfaction doing, if for no other reason than that a 
person usually enjoys something he or she is good at doing. 37 
He dedicates his book to his daughter Nancy, his "editor of last re-
34. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 221. He goes on further to ask "If, in fact, courts are 
more prone to uphold wartime claims of civil liberties after the war is over, may it not actually be 
desirable to avoid decision on such claims during the war?" Id. at 222. 
35. /d. at 222-23. 
36. !d. at 223. 
37. C-SPAN: What do you think of this business of writing books? 
Justice Rehnquist: Well, I enjoy it. It's very nice to be able to write something you 
don't have to get four other people to agree with you, before it can become authorita-
tive. 
See Interview, supra note 9, at 8. 
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sort" who helped him sound "less like a lawyer. "38 Reading this book is 
like sitting next to him at dinner or meeting him for drinks before an 
evening of interesting conversation. This is not his opinion-writing 
style. 39 His book-writing style is informal, relaxed and entertaining, 
even colorful; for example, he takes the liberty of describing one mem-
ber of Lincoln's cabinet as being "brightly plumaged" in contrast to 
another who was a "sparrow. "40 The account of Lincoln's train trip to 
take the oath as President which opens the book and the chapter that 
chronicles the day of his assassination read like a well-written screen-
play.41 The book also pays attention to geography and place, offering 
Michner-like digressions which will interest and educate the reader all 
at once. For example, Rehnquist's explanation about how Maryland 
was settled in the 1600s helps illuminate its politics in the 1860s,42 and 
he also spends some time describing the early history of Indiana and its 
environs. 43 
The Chief Justice's history is full of personalities and characters to 
whom he pays quite a bit of attention. He repeats the familiar story of 
Lincoln taking time to visit Grace Bedell, the little girl who wrote him 
the letter suggesting that he grow his famous chin whiskers. 44 His writ-
ing animates people by describing what they looked like, what they 
sounded like, and their personal mannerisms. 45 He pays attention also to 
the milieus of history, the rooms and furnishings or the surroundings 
and weather, in which the scenes took place to help to set the mood and 
recapture the moment. 46 
The book demonstrates a fascinating and remarkable facility with 
time and relation. Historical figures are situated by relationships and 
38. See Rehnquist. supra note 2, at xiii. 
39. As an aside, my own sense is that when he was an Associate Justice and new to the 
High Court his opinions were more individual and finely literary. He found interesting quotations 
to make his points and he seemed more intent to turn his own quotable phrase. He was more of an 
essayist in the genre of the Justice Jackson, for whom he clerked. These days his opinions are 
more institutional, bordering on the bureaucratic, perhaps because he is Chief Justice and feels 
some hydraulic pressure to write for the Court as a corporate institution. 
40. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 44. The Chief Justice applies the same colorful label to 
Justice Frankfurter. /d. at 194. 
C-SPAN: Now, that language, "a brightly plumaged bird." Is that something you en-
joyed doing when you wrote this book, of using language? 
Justice Rehnquist: Well, I thought that was an apt description of him. You know, I 
don't know that I want to be terribly florid all the time. 
See Interview, supra note 9, at 5. 
41. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 3-11 & 138-43. 
42. /d. at 19. 
43. /d. at 78. 
44. /d. at 5. 
45. /d. at 7-8 & 43. 
46. !d. at 118-19. 
78 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 14 
personal connections; for example, Chief Justice Taney married the 
sister of Francis Scott Key. 47 For the principal figures, the Chief Justice 
traces their family background to help explain the person they were at 
their point in history. 48 He traces relationships and friendships. 49 In ad-
dition, when someone enters the picture who at the time was less im-
portant than he would be later-like James A. Garfield arguing a case 
in the Supreme Court long before he became president-the Chief Jus-
tice fastforwards ahead in his life to tell the reader what the future had 
in store for him. 50 All this is accomplished while maintaining the book's 
rhythm and flow. 
The book likewise has a sense of audience and purpose. 51 The Chief 
Justice plays the part of a patient teacher who must stop to explain, for 
example, the writ of habeas corpus52 or the notion of common law 
crimes53 or the law of conspiracy. 54 When he explains martial law, the 
Chief Justice takes the reader through the history of the War of 1812 
and Dorr's Rebellion to provide background for his own analysis of the 
critical time. 55 He is also a teacher who is interested in knowing and 
explaining the origins of terms like doughface56 or copperheads. 57 Fur-
thermore, he spells out constitutional theory with the same care and at-
tention to detail. For example, his explanation of the 5th and 14th 
amendments and the counter-intuitive idea of reverse incorporation of 
the equal protection component into the due process clause is both sim-
ple and instructive. 58 
When it is appropriate to his subject, the Chief Justice reverts to his 
craft as an appellate judge. His account of Lambdin P. Milligan's trial 
is drawn from the Q & A transcript of the drama of the trial court-
47. /d. at 27. 
48. /d. at 42, 54 & 105. 
49. "Stanton would come first to respect, then to admire, and finally to worship Lincoln." 
/d. at 58. 
50. !d. at 122-23. 
51. C-SPAN: When you wrote it, who did you envision reading it? And what do you 
want them to get out of it? 
Justice Rehnquist: Kind of the intelligent lay people, and interested people in the legal 
profession. And just kind of get out of it that when you are dealing with civil liberties 
in time of war, you're not dealing with, you know straight rectangles, or straight lines 
necessarily. There's fuzziness involved, and there always will be. 
See Interview, supra note 9, at 21. 
52. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 36. 
53. /d. at 85. 
54. !d. at 101. 
55. !d. at 70-71. 
56. !d. at 114. 
57. /d. at 102. 
58. !d. at 207-08. 
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room. 59 He does the same for the arguments in the Supreme Court60 to 
prepare for his dissection of the Supreme Court opinions on decision. 61 
He stops to evaluate the performance of the advocates and their argu-
ments. 62 In one of the most interesting parts of the book, the Chief Jus-
tice applies this appellate judge perspective to the military proceedings 
against the defendants charged with conspiring to assassinate President 
Lincoln. Over two chapters, he reviews the proceedings trial-by-trial 
and defendant-by-defendant. 63 It is fascinating to watch his judicial 
mind struggle with doubts about the government's proof and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence against Mary Suratt and Samuel Mudd.64 In the 
end, his history affirms the military commission but is partly based on 
the legalistic notion of deference towards trial determinations of credi-
bility. 
The Chief Justice as author demonstrates an astuteness for politics 
and a fascination with the Executive Branch that is suggested in his own 
professional background as having served as Assistant Attorney General 
in the Office of Legal Counsel. He provides an insider's account of the 
Republican Party convention of 1860 that helps explain the appointment 
of David Davis to the Supreme Court. 65 Indeed, the Chief Justice care-
fully assesses all of Lincoln's nominations to the Supreme Court like he 
was back in the Department of Justice. 66 
He likewise demonstrates a keen sense of history for the office of 
Chief Justice and for the institution of the Supreme Court down to the 
present day.67 He is understanding of how Chief Justice Stone might 
feel obliged to draft an opinion to mass the Court and then be willing to 
revise it to keep a majority. 68 He praises Chief Justice Taney for his le-
gal acumen and judicial skills but criticizes him when he acted precipi-
tously and injudiciously. 69 You can see him shaking his head while he 
was writing about the self-inflicted wound of the Dred Scott decision. 70 
In the strongest terms, the Chief Justice disapproves of improper influ-
59. /d. at 89-104. 
60. /d. at 118-27. 
61. /d. at 128-43. 
62. /d. at 121 & 124. 
63. /d. at 144-69. 
64. !d. at 162, 165, 167-69. 
65. /d. at 105-12. 
66. /d. at 110-15. 
67. See also William H. Rehnquist, Chief Justices I Never Knew, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
637 (1976). 
68. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 198. 
69. /d. at 41. 
70. !d. at 32; Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
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ences between the White House and the Court. 71 He comments about 
the quality of opinions for their logic and rhetoric and he evaluates de-
cisions for their political timing. 72 He makes connections between his-
toric decisions and modern doctrine. 73 
This is a secondary, popular work of history that does not purport 
to be an original historical investigation. Frequently, when the Chief 
Justice does quote from an original source, it is being quoted from 
some other secondary source. But he demonstrates a preference for 
eyewitness accounts74 and a penchant for the verisimilitude of contem-
porary newspaper articles about the events he is reporting. 75 There are 
enough obscure references sprinkled through his sources that demon-
strate the thoroughness and care of the research that went into this 
book, 76 and he has an obvious preference for more literary history over 
the banal, for example his primary reliance on Carl Sandburg's studies 
of Lincoln. 77 But the endnotes are minimalist and do not intrude on the 
reader. There is a comprehensive but helpful bibliography - what you 
might expect from someone who works next door to the Library of 
Congress. Overall, the Chief Justice demonstrates an intellectual forte 
for synthesizing the previous scholarship of professional historians, a 
skill not unlike fashioning an opinion from the briefs of advocates. 
My Ph.D. friends would label this book "law office history,"78 but 
it is good law office history, perhaps due partly to the fact that the 
Chief Justice did graduate work in history and holds a Masters Degree. 
He hews to the accepted versions of history and does not set out to be-
come his own revisionist 79 though he is careful to note relevant dis-
agreements among historians. 80 
If his opinions were not enough, the Chief Justice's three books-
on the Supreme Court, 81 impeachments, 82 and this latest book on civil 
71. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 30. 
72. !d. at 129. 
73. !d. at 136-37 & 178 n.11. 
74. !d. at 22. 
75. /d. at 21 & 34-35. 
76. /d. at 46 n.2 & 62 n.3. 
77. /d. at 227 (endnotes to Chapters I & 2). 
78. See Alfred H. Kelly, Clio and the Court: AnI/licit Love Affair, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 
119; Mark Tushnet, Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship: The Case of History-in-Law, 71 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 909 (1996); William M. Wiecek, Clio as Hostage: The United States Supreme 
Court and the Uses of History, 24 CAL. W. L. REV. 227 (1988). 
79. But see supra text accompanying note 29. 
80. See Rehnquist, supra note 2, at 82. 
81. WILLIAM H. REHNQU!ST, THE SUPREME COURT- HOW IT WAS, How IT IS (1987). 
82. WILLIAM H. REHNQUJST, GRAND INQUESTS - THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF 
JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992). 
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liberties during wartime-establish him as a remarkably literate consti-
tutional scholar. They reveal the habits of a thoughtful constitutionalist 
and restrained jurist: one who is attendant on the facts, well-versed in 
the law, steeped in political philosophy, and savvy about practical poli-
tics, but somewhat skeptical towards grand theories and judicial de-
signs. He knows his own mind and he is confident in his independent 
conclusions. 83 
The Chief Justice, remindful of Holmes, is above all a pragmatist 
who understands that "a page of history is worth a volume of logic. "84 
And this is a most worthy volume of history. 
83. C-SPAN: What do you think of what Abraham Lincoln did with the writ of ha-
beas corpus during the war? 
Justice Rehnquist: I think, if I'd been president, I would have done exactly the same 
thing. 
See Interview, supra note 16, at 3. 
84. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921). 
